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§ Corresponding author. Abstract 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the changes in the Italian wage 
distribution using administrative data from 1985 to 1996. Various statistical indicators are 
used to document a slight, but not negligible, increase in wage inequality. Standard 
decompositions of inequality indices by population subgroups shed light on the underlying 
causes of the observed distributional changes. Following Junh et al. (1993), econometric-type 
decompositions are also employed to disentangle the effects of observable quantities, prices 
and unobservable factors on inequality trends. The changing prices of observable 
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies on earnings inequality remark that only a relatively few OECD countries 
experienced a significant increase in earnings inequality over the first half of the 1990s. 
Contrary to the fears emerging from the trends documented at the end of the 1980s, only the 
United Kingdom and the United States continued to feature persistent and strong widening 
earnings differentials throughout the 1990s (OECD, 1996). As about Italy, the prevalent 
indications coming from existing research point to a modest or negligible increase in earnings 
inequality, mainly documented on the basis of the Bank of Italy￿s survey on Household 
Savings (see, for example, Brandolini et al., 2000; Erikson and Ichino, 1995; D￿Ambrosio, 
1999; Manacorda, 2002; Rosati, 2001). 
The economic theory has pointed out how a variety of changes in the economy ￿ e.g., 
changes in the industrial structure, increased foreign trade, stronger immigration, skill-based 
technical change and the decline in the labor market institutions that limit the market (e.g., 
labor market legislation and unions) ￿ are consistent with the observation that wage 
differentials have enlarged (see the Symposium on Wage Inequality in the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No.2, Spring 1997). In Italy the role played by the 
institutional framework and its reforms has been particularly emphasized by the existing 
research. Lucifora (1999) stresses the inequality increasing effect of the decline in the 
unionization density (from 49,3% in 1980 to 38% in 1995) and coverage
1 that occurred in 
Italy since the 1980￿s. Erickson and Ichino (1995) also point the finger to the ending of 
synchronized wage bargaining across different sectors. Manacorda (2002) argues that the 
gradual dismantling of the automatic cost-of-living indexation, the Scala Mobile, from the 
second half of the 1980￿s until 1992 (when it was ultimately abolished) may have been the 
main cause of the widening earnings distribution. He goes on by showing that, had the Scala   2 
Mobile been inoperative, earnings inequality in Italy would have increased at a rate similar to 
the one observed in the US. 
This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature on wage inequality in Italy by its 
different data, focus and methods used. The paper takes advantage of the recent availability of 
data from the Italian Institute for Social Security, covering a relatively long time-period, from 
1985 to 1996. Their administrative nature, type of information contained and large sample 
size make them an ideal candidate for supplementing wage inequality analyses based on the 
Bank of Italy￿s survey.  
Drawing on these employee microdata, our main focus will be in assessing how much of 
the increase in earnings inequality can be attributed to changes in three main factors 
underlying each employee’s received wage, namely the characteristics of the individual or of 
the job, the price attached to them by the market, and the effect of unobservable attributes. 
We first compute various statistical indicators and document a slight, but not negligible, 
increase in wage inequality throughout the observation period. Standard decompositions of 
inequality indices by population subgroups are used to identify the key univariate factors 
underlying the observed distributional changes. Following Junh et al. (1993), we then employ 
multivariate econometric-type decompositions to disentangle the effects on inequality trends 
of (i) sample composition, (ii) the returns to observable attributes and (iii) unobservable 
factors. Finally, a simple statistical method is used to show that the increase in inequality is 
mainly due to a widening in the permanent ￿ rather than transitory ￿ components of earnings. 
The first two approaches tell a consistent story and complement the picture on wage 
inequality emerging from existing research in Italy. In particular, it is found that most of the 
increase in inequality is due to a rise in the return of observable characteristics, while the role 
of unobserved prices and quantities - at the heart of suggested explanations for countries such   3 
the US and the UK ￿ appears to count less. This conclusion is shown to be consistent with the 
role that the permanent component of the variance has in driving earnings inequality. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and section 3 offers a 
preliminary analysis of the changes occurred in the Italian wage distribution. Inequality trends 
for the population as a whole are documented using standard indices. Univariate 
decompositions of these indices by subgroups are performed in section 4, while the 
decomposition approach of Juhn et al. (1993) is presented in section 5. Section 6 examines 
the contributions of permanent and transitory factors in the observed inequality trends, while 
sensitivity analyses to the choice of the wage definition and sample selection are carried out 
in section 7. Section 8 gathers the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
2.  Data and Definitions 
The INPS data contain information on a sample of Italian employees over a period of 
twelve years ￿ from 1985 up to 1996.
2 For each calendar year, the Social Security forms of 
employees born on the 10
th of March, June, September and December were selected to form a 
sequence of random samples of the population of employees (sampling ratio 1:91). Each 
yearly sample includes approximately 100,000 workers of Italian private firms, with the 
exclusion of agriculture and the central state administration.
3 The firm￿s longitudinal records 
are then accessed for each worker in the sample and the employer￿s attributes are linked to the 
employee, obtaining a matched employer-employee database. Available information include 
individuals￿ wages, career histories and a number of worker￿s characteristics (gender, age, job 
qualification and geographical region of work) and of the firm where the job is held (size and 
sector of activity).  
As we do not observe the number of hours worked by an employee, we cannot compute 
hourly wages. We do however know the number of paid days
4 for each job spell and the   4 
corresponding remuneration, which allows us to compute the employee￿s monthly wage after 
a suitable normalization. The monthly wage is obtained by dividing the employee￿s gross 
annual earnings by the number of days s/he got paid for during the year. This normalization 
takes us as close as possible to a measure of hourly wages, an ideal variable for evaluating the 
economic conditions of each employment position. The result is then multiplied by an average 
working month of 26 days, and deflated by the 1996 consumer prices index for white and blue 
collar worker households (source: ISTAT). 
The sample has been restricted to all employees with age between 15 and 64. The wage 
distribution has been trimmed at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles so as to minimize measurement 
and reporting errors. Our sample includes part-time workers, whose wages have been 
converted in terms of full-time equivalent.
5 Section 7 explores the consequences of excluding 
individuals employed in part-time jobs.  
 
3.  Changes in the Italian wage distribution, 1985-1996. 
By way of first acquaintance with our data, let us consider in Figure 1 the Kernel density 
functions of earnings for three reference years only, 1985, 1991 and 1996, i.e. the start, an 
intermediate and the final year in our sample. 
<Figure 1 around here> 
First, note how at both ends of each density function, the curve is rather low: there are 
relatively few people with very low wages, and also relatively few with very high wages. The 
vast majority of the population has monthly wages between about 2 and 4 millions of Italian 
liras (￿1=ITL1936.27), the mode being at about 2.4. Second, all three curves are asymmetrical 
towards the right hand side, pointing to the existence of a relatively small number of very well 
paid individuals, a fact confirmed below by a mean wage exceeding the median. Note how the 
right tail has become even thicker towards the end of the period, a circumstance that hints to 
an increase in overall wage dispersion. Third, though the density curve appears to be   5 
relatively smooth and unimodal, some wage clumping can be observed ￿ particularly so in 
1985 ￿ in the left tail. In subsequent years, this ￿bump￿ of wage concentration gets flatter but 
does not disappear completely.
6 The existence of nationally-agreed "wage floors", 
differentiated by sector and job institutional rankings (livelli di inquadramento) - in effect 
acting as (a set of) minimum wages - can be partly held responsible for the manifestation of 
this bump. The decline in the degree of wage bargaining synchronization may have 
contributed to its subsequent smoothing out. Finally, observe how the 1991 density function 
resembles a shift to the right of the 1985 density, while the 1996 density appears to be located 
in between. As we show below, this pattern is consistent with the business cycle that the 
Italian economy went through during the period. 
Figure 2 displays the time series of the mean, median (also referred to as p50), and the 
tenth and ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution ￿ denoted by p10 and p90, respectively.  
<Figure 2 around here> 
The temporal path of real mean earnings reflects the growth the Italian economy 
experienced until 1992, when it reaches its maximum value, and its substantial slowdown 
thereafter. The mean￿s decline is such that it reaches in 1996 almost the same value it had in 
1990; despite that, over the twelve years in our data average earnings grew by about 11%. A 
similar path can be observed for the median and for the bottom and top percentiles. Note, 
though, that p90 and p50 started to decline at least one year earlier than p10, this latter 
reaching its maximum in 1993. The economic slowdown seems, then, to have hurt 
medium/high earnings prompter than earnings at the bottom of the distribution. 
Notwithstanding this, the earnings of the richest 10% have grown by a stunning 20% over the 
1985-1996 period, compared to a more modest 15% of the poorest 10% of the population. 
Workers in the median position saw, on the other hand, an earnings growth of 4% only. 
   6 
Earnings inequality  
When focusing on the behavior of the three earnings percentiles chosen, earnings 
differences in the Italian distribution seem to have enlarged over the 1980s and 1990s, though 
the increase may appear a modest one if compared to the changes experienced by other 
developed countries, the US in particular.
7 
<Table 1 around here> 
The first half of Table 1 shows the temporal series of various percentile ratios. In 1985 the 
monthly wage of the person at the richest tenth of the population was 2.3 times the wage of 
the person at the poorest tenth; by 1996, the ratio had enlarged at 2.4 (a 4% rise). Even more 
did the distance increase between the richest tenth and the median, as their ratio was 1.5 in 
1985 and 1.7 in 1996 (a 15% rise). On the other hand, the poorest tenth gained ground with 
respect to the median, with a ratio that exhibited a 10% drop from 1985 to 1996. Overall, the 
evidence presented points to a reduction in earnings differentials in the poorest half of the 
distribution, to be set against an increase in the richest half. 
This conclusion is only partly confirmed by a look at the behavior of the earnings shares of 
decile groups of the population. The second half of Table 1 depicts in more detail the 
changing fortunes in different parts of the distribution. Small drops in the earnings share of 
deciles 2-8 are in contrast to the more substantial gains recorded by the bottom and top 
deciles. These findings suggest that a limited amount of polarization towards the extremes of 
the Italian earnings distribution might have taken place over the time period studied, with the 
best well-paid jobs ￿ but also the least well-paid ones ￿ improving their situation at the 
expenses of those in the median position.  
OECD (1996, chart 3.3) reports that real wages of low paid workers (first decile) have 
risen for most countries during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (the 
United States and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand and Australia are exceptions). However   7 
only in a small group of OECD countries (Germany, Finland and Canada) among the 13 
studied is the growth of p10 higher than that of the median and p90. Interestingly, the results 
therein shown for Italy (deriving from the Bank of Italy survey for the period 1983-93) are at 
variance with our own, as p10 is shown to grow by less than both p50 and p90.
8 
The improvement of the economic situation of the least advantaged prevents us to 
predicate that inequality has unambiguously increased in the Italian earnings distribution. 
Economic inequality is often quantitatively assessed by resorting to summary measures that 
aggregate information on the individuals￿ incomes, putting different weights on different parts 
of the distribution. In the case of the Italian earnings distribution, then, it might well be 
possible that any measure that puts enough weight to the improved economic situation of the 
bottom tenth ends up declaring that earnings inequality indeed lowered over the time period 
1985-1996.  
For a battery of commonly used measures of inequality, though, inequality is found to have 
increased. Three of them are reported in Table 2 (see Borgarello and Devicienti, 2002, for full 
results). The rise slows down after 1991, but the inequality level in 1996 is still about 13% 
higher than in 1985 according to the Gini coefficient and almost 31% higher if the index of 
Theil is used instead. Standard errors appear to be rather small and that increases our 
confidence in the statistical validity of our conclusions about the inequality trends. 
<Table 2 around here> 
In the introduction we have recalled a number of institutional factors and reforms that have 
been suggested as potential explanations for the observed rise in wage inequality in Italy. 
While it is not the aim of the present paper to further explore those arguments, a few 
considerations can be made on the basis of the preliminary evidence reported above. 
In particular, the period characterized by the absence of the automatic cost-of-living 
indexation does not coincide in Table 2 with any acceleration of the rise in wage inequality.   8 
On the contrary, the steepest change is observed during the period 1985-1992, when the scala 
mobile was undergoing a process of gradual dismantling. This is consistent with the view that 
the egalitarian bias of this institutional constraint had been previously binding (i.e. effective in 
keeping inequality below its constraint-free level) and that its elimination allowed earnings to 
open up in accordance with market forces. In this sense, the steep rise of the 1985-1992 
period would emerge as a rapid adjustment of inequality to its «equilibrium level»; the 
subsequent slowdown would then simply signal that the «equilibrium path» has been reached. 
Another possible explanation for the rather flat trend in the mid nineties may be found in 
the impact of the economic slowdown of 1993 and 1994. In principle the effect of the 
business cycle on earnings inequality is unclear, crucially depending on the pattern of growth 
in different subgroups of the distribution. If earnings everywhere increase by the same 
proportion, relative inequality measures (like the ones we have used) do not change. On the 
other hand, overall growth is inequality enhancing when it implies disproportional gains 
(losses) for those at the top (bottom) of the earnings scale.
9 OECD (1996) reports that ￿no 
uniform picture emerges either across countries or over time of a cyclical pattern in the 
dispersion of wages￿, (p.63). In the case of Italy, we find only weak evidence that inequality 
is higher when average income grows and tends to lower during the recession years.
10 
The ￿stability pact￿ signed between the unions and the government in 1992 with the aim of 
inaugurating a new season of wage moderation - in the face of the increasing demand for 
financial stability coming from the EU - might also be invoked as a potential cause for the 
leveling off of wage inequality in the first half of the nineties.  
Finally, one cannot rule out the possibility that the market forces pushing towards 
increased earnings dispersion might have weakened (e.g., as a result of the gradual absorption 
of the tensions coming from the wave of technological innovations started in the late 
seventies). We will come back to this issue in Section 5.    9 
While we cannot fully discriminate between these conjectures, the next section will start 
providing further explanations of the observed trends in inequality by studying how earnings 
changed within and between different subgroups of the population. It should be emphasized 
that the business of disentangling the disparate causes of the rise in wage inequality is 
inherently complex, mostly because they can act simultaneously, which would require a 
hardly tractable general equilibrium analysis. In this respect, the simple decomposition 
techniques used below ￿ notwithstanding their obvious limitations ￿ can help the researcher to 
identify some key factors underlying the recorded distributional changes.  
 
4.  Changes in the earnings distribution: Univariate decomposition analyses 
Underlying these decompositions is the basic intuition that some causal factors affect the 
earnings distribution by changing, in various combinations, three basic ingredients: (1) the 
number of persons in each subgroup, (2) the mean earnings in these subgroups, and finally (3) 
the dispersion within each subgroup. Three inequality measures are exactly decomposable 
(e.g. Cowell, 1995; Jenkins, 1995), in that total inequality is the sum of a within-group 
component (an average of the subgroup inequalities, weighted by the subgroup share), plus a 
between-group component (the amount of inequality that would remain if there was no 
inequality within any sub-group. They are members of the single parameter Generalized 
Entropy class: the mean logarithmic deviation, denoted GE(0), the Theil index, GE(1), and 
half the square of the coefficient of variation, GE(2). Table 3 contains the results of this 
decomposition exercise and presents an illustrative example too. For each partition of the 
population, the table reports the subgroup￿s mean earnings, share, and inequality levels; it also 
shows the within and between levels of inequality. Needless to say, the number of break-
downs considered has only been constrained by the information available in the INPS data. 
<Table 3 around here>   10 
Table 4 reports instead the 1985-1996 percentage change for the mean and the percentiles 
in each subgroup. In the interest of brevity, both tables will refer to a direct comparison only 
of the first and the last years in our sample (see Borgarello and Devicienti, 2002, for complete 
time series of mean earnings, percentiles and percentile ratios for each subgroup). The 
decomposition analysis of Section 5 will be also carried out over shorter time intervals.     
<Table 4 around here> 
 
Gender 
It is well known that the participation of women to the Italian labor market has been 
increasing over time, and in fact female employees had a share of 30% in 1985 and of 33% in 
1996. Though women￿s mean earnings in 1996 were still about 20% lower than men￿s, the 
growth rates reported in the Table 4 demonstrates that female employees have been catching 
up with men over the time period studied, a finding common to all OECD countries (OECD, 
1996). Female￿s average earnings grew by almost 15% from 1985 to 1996, while men￿s 
growth was only 11%. At all percentile points, too, female employees saw their earnings 
expand more than men. Particularly impressive was the pay raise of the poorest female tenth, 
which increased by 30% compared to a much smaller 6% for men. In Italy, more than in other 
OECD countries, the gender gap is narrowed not only because of the substantial earnings rise 
of more qualified women, but also ￿ and above all ￿ because women￿s growth at the bottom 
of the distribution has been larger than for men. For the three summary measures considered, 
inequality is higher for men than for women at the start and at the end of the sample period, 
and is also increasing faster. The lion’s share of observed inequality is held by the within-
group component, but inequality between men and women explains between four and eight 
percent of total inequality. Moreover, the within-group component has been expanding over 
time, highlighting an increasing return to observable and unobservable characteristics other 
than gender. That the differences between men and women have reduced over time is also   11 
demonstrated by a falling between-group contribution. Taken together these findings suggest 
that women have contributed to a decrease in overall wage inequality. 
 
Age group 
The youngest employees (aged 15-24) had a share of about 26 per cent in 1985, which 
dropped at only 17% in 1996, in part a reflection of the increase in schooling for this group. 
The oldest age group (aged 50-64) shrunk too, though to a much lesser extent (from 14% in 
1985 to 13% in 1996), also because of various incentives for early retirement introduced in 
the mid nineties (Sestito, 2002).
11 On the other hand, those with age 25-34 expanded their 
share, from 28 to 35 per cent, as did those with age 35-49, from 32 to 35 per cent.  
Table 4 demonstrates that the gap between the very young (new entrants to the labor 
market) and the oldest workers (the almost-leavers) has visibly magnified over the 1980s and 
the 1990s. In fact, while the new-entrants’ mean grew by only 2.6%, the mean for the almost-
leavers jumped up of about 21% over the entire time window. Mainly this is the result of the 
stunning growth experienced by those aged 50-64 and receiving very high wages, as shown 
by a 35% raise of p90.
12 The same percentile for those aged 15-24 was virtually unchanged in 
1996 from its value in 1985. To a lesser extent a similar discrepancy is also found for the 
medians of the two groups. Relatively to the population mean, the mean of the youngest 
cohort decreased from 0.79 to 0.73, while the reduction of the next younger group fell from 
about unity to 0.93. On the contrary, the two most senior groups saw their mean wages 
increase relative to the overall mean. However, at very low wages the new-entrants score a 
higher growth than the almost-leavers, with p10 increasing respectively of 14% and 8%. 
Whether this is the effect of institutional constraints (e.g., labor market legislation for young 
employees) or of more general market forces is hard to say with the available information.  
Wage inequality widened in all but the youngest age group (due to the improved situation 
of very low wages in that group). Once again the bulk of observed inequality is within-group,   12 
and this is increasing too. However, differences between age groups are important (being able 
to account for between 13 and 19 percent of aggregate inequality) and have exacerbated 
during the 1990s. These findings suggest that the structural changes in the Italian labor market 
might have pushed the return to seniority and experience upwards. 
 
Sector of activity 
We next partition the totality of jobs in three activity sectors - constructions, manufacturing 
and services. Table 3 reports a decline in the share of manufacturing from 57% in 1985 to 
52% in 1996. Constructions too shrunk, from a share of 13% in 1985 to a tinier 10% at the 
end of the period. On the other hand, workers employed in the service sector witnessed an 
expansion from a share of 30% to 38%. Mean earnings growth was fairly low for construction 
(a 2% change during the period) and much higher in manufacturing (10%) and services 
(15%). In 1985, mean earnings were highest in constructions, followed by services and 
manufacturing. In the following years services emerge as the sector that pays better on 
average, 6% more than manufacturing and 10% more than constructions in 1996. 
Construction is the sector that guarantees better pay for employees at the bottom (p10) and at 
the median of the distribution
13, followed by manufacturing, but the ranking is completely 
reversed when we look at p90. Services is the sector with highest inequality levels in both 
1985 and 1996, followed by manufacturing and constructions. However, in terms of 
inequality growth, earnings differentials opened faster in manufacturing, followed by 
constructions and services. Virtually all observed inequality is accounted for by the within-
group component. The between-group component increased in 1996, though of an almost 
negligible amount. Overall, these results suggest that the modification that occurred to the 
Italian industrial structure over the 1980s and 1990s cannot be held responsible for an 
important part of the observed increase in earnings inequality.  
   13 
Occupations 
The data allows us to distinguish only four broad occupations. Blue collar workers had a 
share equal to 66 percent in 1985, white collars were at 26 percent, managers at 0.4 and 
apprentices at 7 percent of the population. These shares went through important structural 
changes during our sample period, with both white collars and managers absorbing a larger 
proportion of the Italian employees at the expenses of the other two groups. Blue collars￿ 
average wages were below the overall average in 1985 and lost additional ground during the 
next 11 years, their relative mean dropping from 0.95 to 0.88. White collars kept their relative 
mean wages above the aggregate mean in both years and no appreciable trend can be spotted. 
A bit surprising is the circumstance that both managers and apprentices saw their relative 
mean earnings decline over the sample period (see footnote 17). Table 3 suggests that white 
collars have the most unequal earnings distribution, according to whichever of the three 
indices is used and in both 1985 and 1996. This is a reflection of the higher growth of p90 for 
white collars compared to blue collars. The within-group component certainly explains most 
of the observed inequality but note that for this population partition the between-group 
component is now able to explain as large as 36% of observed inequality. Moreover, this 
component has exhibited an impressive growth during the period 1985-1996, more than 
doubling its level. This implies that the skills related to the above occupational partition have 
increasingly attracted differential rate of returns in the labor market. 
 
Firm size 
Panel G of Table 3 shows that the share of those working in small firms (up to 20 
employees) has been shrinking over the sample period, with a corresponding increase in the 
proportion of those in larger firms. The three inequality indices seem to indicate that earnings 
differences were more acute for small firms than large ones in 1985, but during the 
subsequent twelve years this pattern is inverted. There does not seem to be an obvious   14 
explanation for the more pronounced raise in inequality levels that characterized employees in 
large firms. Note also that relative mean earnings have increased only for employees in the 
two largest firm categories. Some composition effects seem to be at play: young workers are 
disproportionately concentrated in small firms, while the most mature labor force is more 
abundant in large firms.
14 The general weakening of the labor market institutions (e.g., the 
unions), which in Italy have traditionally been disproportionately concentrated on defending 
workers in large firms, might also be invoked as a potential rationalization worth further 
investigation. During the period 1985-96, the lowest percentile grew much more for 
employees in small sized firms than for those in large firms, while the opposite can be 
observed with respect to the highest percentile, providing hints that earnings become more 
dispersed as firms expand their size. The within component is predominant, and further 
enlarges over time, but the between component is able to account for a fairly high proportion 
of observed inequality (up to 21%) and is growing faster than the within component.  
 
Part-time 
The share of part-time workers passed from 1% in 1985 to 8% in 1996. Mean earnings in 
full time jobs are higher than in part-time jobs (though note that part-time jobs paid slightly 
better, on average, in 1985). Inequality was higher for part-time workers in 1985, but by 1996 
the situation had reversed. The between-component, though slightly increasing, does not 
account for a significant proportion of the observed inequality.      
 
Geographical areas 
The wage distributions of three macro-regions (North, South and Center
15) do not seem to 
differ much, particularly so in 1996 when it becomes hard to distinguish the three curves (see 
Figure 3). In 1985 the South stands out for its more pronounced bump in the left-hand tail and 
its tri-modality (its highest mode is larger than the modes in the remaining macro-areas). Note   15 
also that in 1985 the proportion of employees with low monthly earnings was higher in the 
South, followed by the Center. However, these features do not seem to persist in 1996. This 
substantial uniformity in the wage distribution across regional areas ￿ which is to a large 
extent the result of the lack of decentralized wage setting mechanisms - has been indicated by 
many commentators as one of the reasons for the failing convergence processes between the 
developed North of the country and the more economically backward and high-
unemployment South.
16 To our aims it is here important to stress that regional differences, 
and their changes, do not seem to have contributed to the rise in earnings inequality. This is 
pointed out by the completely flat path of the between-group component in Table 3, panel D.  
<Figure 3 around here> 
 
5.  Components of change in wage inequality 
In the previous section inequality indices have been decomposed in their between and 
within components when the population is partitioned according to one characteristic at a 
time. It has been shown that, in general, observed inequality can only marginally be explained 
by our sex, age, occupation or sector partitions. In fact, the within-group component - i.e. the 
inequality explained by factors other than the partitioning characteristic ￿ is by far the most 
important source of the observed earnings differentials. However, it has also been remarked 
how the returns to experience and skill ￿ as proxied by age and occupation - have shown an 
increasing pattern during the period, as documented by a relatively large and increasing 
between-group component. If inequality between characteristics such as occupation, sex and 
age group has increased that might be because the composition of the sample with respect to 
those characteristics have changed over time (sample composition effect), or because the 
return (or price) attached to those characteristics has increased during the time period. 
Moreover, total inequality can increase because of changes in unobserved quantities and 
prices, which manifest their impact through modifications in the within-group component.   16 
In order to disentangle and quantify the contribution of changing observable quantities, 
observable prices and unobservables (prices and quantities) to the overall increase in 
inequality, we take on board what can be considered multivariate (econometric-type) 
decomposition techniques, as proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) and by them applied to US data. 
Suppose that the evolution of (log) wages, Yit, is given by: 
Yit = Xit￿t + uit         ( 1 )  
where  Xit is a vector of characteristics (e.g., experience) and ￿t a vector of parameters 
representing the prices attached by the market to those characteristics (e.g., return to 
experience). Residuals uit capture unobserved factors and have distribution function Ft. If θit 
denotes the rank of individual i in the cumulative residual distribution Ft, then we can write: 
uit = 
1 −
t F  (θit) .          ( 2 )  
Expression (1) can be re-written as: 
Yit = Xit*β  + Xit*( ￿t - β ) + 
1 − F  (θit) + [
1 −
t F  (θit) - 
1 − F  (θit)] (3) 
which shows how the earnings distribution (and its inequality) may vary over time because of 
changes in the sample composition with respect to Xit, at fixed prices β  (first term in the right 
hand side in (3)), because of changes in prices at given quantities (second term), or finally 
because of changes in the distribution of the unobservables. Accordingly, we will compute the 




it Y =  X it*β  + 
1 − F ( θit)        (4) 
  
2
it Y  = Xit*￿t + 
1 − F  (θit)      (5) 
  
3
it Y  = Xit*￿t + 
1 −
t F  (θit)      (6) 
As specified in (4), 
1
it Y  is obtained from the characteristics that individuals have in t, 
multiplied by the average vector of coefficients β  and drawing the residual of each individual 
from the average distribution 
1 − F , according to his/her rank in the distribution at time t.  β    17 
and 
1 − F  are obtained from a pooled (over the whole sample period) version of (1). We then 
compute inequality I(
1
it Y ) for each year and attribute any inequality change over time to the 




it Y ). Next, we compute I(
2
it Y ) and attribute to a price 






it Y ). Finally, we compute I(
3
it Y ) and 
attribute any further change of inequality to the effect of changing unobservables: 
U
t I  = I(
3
it Y ) 
- 
Q
t I  - 
P
t I . 
The results of our analysis are shown in Figure 4 and Table 5. Unlike previous sections, we 
have now confined our treatment to men only, as it is generally more difficult to model 
women￿s earnings due to the complications arising from participation decisions. For 
simplicity we have used as our inequality indices I the log wage differentials between the 
ninth and the tenth percentile, the ninth and the median, and the median and the tenth, though 
it should be noted that the procedure can be applied to any inequality measure.  
With reference to the first of these indicators, Figure 4, panel A, first shows the inequality 
trend observed in the men’s distribution, to be decomposed in the three components as 
explained above. Panel B documents that the changing sample composition in terms of 
observable characteristics (the changing group shares documented in Table 3) has only had a 
slight positive impact on the trend of the ninth-tenth differential. The effect of prices, depicted 
in panel C, is instead quite surprising: it seems as if most of the observed inequality increase 
is due to rising returns to skills, as proxied by our age and occupation controls in (1). In panel 
D, the effect of changes in unobservables is shown to be relatively unimportant, though 
slightly increasing over the sample period. It is interesting to note that the results of Juhn et 
al. for the US (and also those for the UK reported by Prasad, 2002) points to a different 
pattern as to which components exert the biggest impact in driving the observed inequality 
trends. In fact, in the US it is the massive increase in the component due to the unobservables   18 
that is often invoked as an explanation for the well-documented increase in wage inequality, 
and indeed this is confirmed by the analysis presented by Juhn et al. (1993) too. In Italy, on 
the other hand, it seems that earnings have become more dispersed precisely because more 
senior, more experienced and, ultimately, more skilled workers have been able to attract a 
greater and greater reward in the new labour market environment. 
Table 5 computes the change from the beginning and the end of the overall time period, as 
well as for three sub periods, of the three percentile ratios, along with the contributions of the 
three components to those changes. In panel A the decomposition refer to the period 1995-
1985, i.e. after excluding the final year in our sample. This was done because, while total 
inequality slightly decreased in that year, the quantity and the price components show sizeable 
opposite movements. We have reasons to believe that these 1996 components might have 
been overestimated due to some data re-labelling occurred in that year, and we have therefore 
decided to concentrate on the first 11 years in our sample.
18  
With reference to the 1995-1985 period (panel A), the change in the ninth and the tenth 
percentile is 0.13, of which almost 80% is due to the price component. The impact of the 
unobservables is positive but very small (accounting for only 13% of the total inequality rise), 
while the changing sample composition had an even smaller positive impact (contributing to 
about 8% of the total change). The decompression in the upper part of the distribution was 
higher still, as shown by a change in the p90-p50 ratio equal to about 0.15. Once again the 
price component exert the greatest impact on the overall change, but changes in the sample 
composition over time have also a substantial positive impact (almost twice as much the 
impact of unobservable attributes). Note also that between 1985 and 1995 the first half of the 
distribution underwent a certain amount of wage compression, as revealed by the negative 
(albeit small) change in the p50-p10 ratio. The price effect is positive in this case too, but 
more than counterbalanced by the combined negative impact of the composition and   19 
unobservable components. This may entail that, as a result of the de-industrialization and 
greater employment flexibility (part-time opportunities), the pool of workers employed at low 
wages has become more homogeneous, thereby with a negative effect on total inequality in 
that part of the distribution.  
The remaining panels of Figure 4 confirm that the bulk of inequality increase occurred 
during the first sub-period (1985-1988), with the pattern of components contributions broadly 
reflecting that discussed with reference to the entire period. Between 1989 and 1992 
inequality continued to increase but at a slower pace, once again with the price components 
being the major driving force. In the subsequent four years the wage distribution showed little 
trend, which mainly seems to be attributable to a composition effect. 
In summary, our analysis points to the crucial role of changing prices of such observed 
attributes as age and skills in shaping the changes in the earnings distribution over the mid 
eighties and mid nineties. This evidence is consistent with skill-biased technological change 
theories as well as with those studies that highlight general labour-market liberalization. 
Italy￿s wage setting process has been and still is dominated by industry-wide national unions￿ 
wage contracts, which in effect cover the almost totality of regular jobs. These contracts 
specify wage floors and wage increases differentiated by skill levels and seniority. While 
these worker￿s attributes have continued to shape the earnings differentials implicit in the 
wage contracts, the liberalization processes intervening in the labour market in those years has 
over time required that their price/return ￿ traditionally constrained by the egalitarian policies 
of the unions of the sixties and seventies - become more in line with the new labour market 
environment (in turn hit by the IT revolution and the rise in the relative demand for skills). 
Whether the recent slowdown in the inequality rise is the result of a gradual absorption of the 
excess demand for skills is an issue that future research may enlighten. 
<Figure 4 around here>   20 
<Table 5 around here> 
 
6.  Permanent versus transitory inequality 
The previous analysis has highlighted that the price of certain observable characteristics 
has had a dominant role in explaining the cross-sectional trends in earnings inequality. To the 
extent that characteristics such as experience and occupation ￿ which in turn are highly 
correlated with education that we do not observe ￿ can be regarded as permanent (or slowly 
changing) characteristics of the individuals, we should observe that an increasing portion of 
the cross-sectional income variability is accounted by the permanent differences between the 
individuals. To investigate the validity of this conjecture, we now take advantage of the panel 
dimension of our data. We estimate the transitory and the permanent components of the 
earnings variance following the simple method suggested by Moffit and Gottschalk (2002). 
The basic idea is that the permanent component can be approximated by the covariance of 
pairs of earnings of the same individual, chosen to be sufficiently far that any transitory errors 
can be assumed to be uncorrelated. In particular, the permanent-transitory model is  
yia = µ i + ν ia            ( 7 )  
where  yia is the log earnings for individual i at age a,  µ i is a time-invariant individual 
component with variance σ µ
2 and ν ia is a transitory component with variance σ ν
2. If we 
assume that Cov(µ i , ν ia) = 0, then Var (yia) = σ µ
2 + σ ν
2. Moreover, for ν ia and ν ia￿ sufficiently 
distant in time, we can assume that Cov (ν ia , ν ia￿) = 0, so that Cov(yia, yia￿) = σ µ
2. This means 
that, after estimating the permanent component by the covariance of observed earnings, we 
can easily compute the transitory component by subtracting the first from the variance. The 
results are shown in Figure 5 for the sample of men, using a 5-year distance between yia and 
yia￿. We experimented with various earnings lags and always got the same conclusions.   21 
Figure 5 shows that the slightly increasing trend in total inequality of log earnings 
(measured by their variance) during the period 1990-96 is the result of two opposing forces, 
an increasing path for the permanent component and a decreasing path for the transitory 
component. This evidence is indeed consistent with the view expressed above: the main 
reason for the inequality trends observed in the Italian earnings distribution has to do with 
widening earnings differential of a permanent nature. As shown in section 5, these in turn are 
due to the rise in the prices of the observable and permanent characteristics of the employees. 
Cappellari (2000), using covariance-structure models also concluded that the overall earnings 
inequality increase experienced in Italy since the 80s was prevalently driven by the permanent 
component. 
<Figure 5 around here> 
 
7.  Job precariousness, part-time and wages 
So far we have considered employees who work any number of days during the year and 
made their remuneration comparable by dividing annual earnings by the number of days. We 
noted how disadvantaged subgroups of the population, for example women at the lower 
extreme of the distribution, have seen their relative position improve over time. Changes in 
the labour market may then have become more favourable to those subgroups by, for instance, 
making more remunerative the (increased) opportunities for part-time work. General 
employment flexibility is also generally thought of as a valuable asset in the labour market, 
which firms may be ready to pay at an increasing rate. In order to shed some light on these 
considerations, we restrict our sample to employees with uninterrupted job spells, by 
requiring that they report a number of annual paid days equal to 312 (equivalent to 52 worked 
weeks). With this requisite we intend to select individuals with stable jobs and careers and 
assess how far the results found in the previous section still apply. Given the observed   22 
tendency ￿ in Europe as elsewhere ￿ of a substitution of jobs-for-life with short-spell jobs, a 
comparison of the trends in the wage distribution for the selected subgroup with that of the 
whole population may provide elements for an assessment of the changing risks of 
segmentation in the labour market. Selected statistics calculated over the sub-sample 
(employees with 312 days only) are reported in the second half of Table 4, while the first half 
refers to the same statistics obtained with reference to the unrestricted sample and discussed 
in the previous sections. 
The most striking difference between the two parts of the table is the divergence that 
emerges in the 1985-1996 change for the poorest percentile calculated on the two samples. If 
we consider employees with 312 worked days, then for almost all the worker categories that 
may be deemed as ￿weak segments￿ (female, young) there has been a much smaller rise in 
p10 than what has been reported in the previous sections. For example, female worker￿s p10 
grew by only 12%, instead of the 30% gain predicated in section 3. Similar conclusions can 
be reached if we look at age classes or at the firm-size split: both young and small firms show 
a much reduced increase (respectively 4.9% and 24.5%) in the poorest percentile which 
contrasts with the figures reported in the first half of Table 4. As for occupation, we note that 
white collars see the 7.3% gain in p10 recorded from 1985 to 1996 reduce to a 5.8% change if 
only full-time year-round workers are considered. The same conclusion holds for blue collars, 
whose 2.3% gain in p10 becomes a 1.7% when restricting the attention to full-time year-round 
workers. Surprises can also be seen when examining firm sectors, the most striking behaviour 
been that p10 in services now grows by 14%, whilst it was reported to increase by 25% with 
reference to the unrestricted sample.  
Though far from conclusive, this evidence highlights the potential role of temporary/part-
time jobs in shaping the wage distribution at low wages, and, even more so, its trends. By 
construction the stable workers in the restricted sample do not carry out any part-time jobs   23 
and, it would seem, this circumstance may be particularly ￿unfavourable￿ for those at the 
bottom of the distribution. Indeed prospects of improving one￿s relative position in the wage 
distribution over time appear rosier for those at the bottom if they are able to take advantage 
of such opportunities as part-time and temporary work. At the extreme, one may also argue 
that what might be sometimes regarded as ￿job precariousness￿ might instead be a proxy for a 
number of job characteristics that have attracted, over time, a sort of monetary premium 




This paper has studied the changes in the Italian earnings distribution from 1985 to 1996, 
using INPS administrative data, a complementary source to the survey data most often used 
for analyzing earnings inequality in Italy. We have documented a slight, but not negligible, 
increase in wage inequality, according to a battery of commonly used distributional 
indicators. The gap between the richest and the poorest tenth broadened, but by less than what 
happened to the distance between the richest tenth of the distribution and the median. This is 
due to the poorest tenth, which managed to reduce its relative distance from that of the person 
in the median position. The bulk of the increase occurred during the second half of the 
eighties, while the trend becomes flatter after 1992.  
While the increase in the overall wage inequality can be established with little doubts, the 
reasons for its occurrence should continue to occupy future research. Our paper has 
contributed to the existing literature by providing univariate and multivariate decompositions 
that shed light on the underlying mechanisms. For all the population partitions used, 
inequality is mainly explained by its within-group component. In all cases, this is increasing 
too. The between-group component is, however, particularly important for the   24 
decompositions by occupation and age group. Moreover for these categories the between 
component is increasing, almost doubling its value over the sample period. 
Both the univariate and the multivariate decompositions have suggested a consistent story, 
that the increase in inequality cannot be explained by a change in the sample composition 
with respect to observable worker attribute; nor is it due to changes in the distribution of 
unobservables, as it has been documented to be the case for the US. In Italy it is instead the 
effect of changing prices of the observable characteristics that plays a major role in 
accounting for the observed inequality increase. If earnings have become more dispersed, that 
seems to be because more senior, more experienced and, ultimately, more skilled workers 
have been able to attract a greater and greater reward in the new labor market environment. 
Such conclusion finds additional support from the decomposition of the cross-sectional 
earnings variances in their permanent and transitory component. 
The paper also compared the wage distribution of the whole sample with that of the 
subsample of employees in stable jobs and careers. Some evidence is found consistent with 
the idea that increased employment flexibility (in terms of part-time/temporary jobs 
availability) is an asset firms have been willing to pay for at an increasing rate, as indicated by 
the positive discrepancy in the pay growth of the least well-paid jobs in the two samples. 
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1 The union coverage was still at 82% of the employed in 1995. 
2 See Contini (2002) for a detailed description of the INPS data. 
3 Using available identifiers (fiscal and social security codes), individual longitudinal data can be generated for 
each worker. For the purposes of the present paper, however, the data will be mainly treated as a set of repeated 
cross-sections. The panel element ￿ notwithstanding its limitations due to the sample ￿attrition￿ over time (see 
Contini, 2002) - is instead necessary for the permanent and transitory inequality decomposition of section 6. 
4 Some of the paid days may not be worked days, since, included under this heading, are periods of paid time 
during which no work is done, e.g. maternity leave, sick leave, holiday. 
5 To do this the number of days worked in a part-time job spell is multiplied by a factor (less than 1) that 
converts them in terms of full-time equivalent. The converting factor is computed as the ratio between the 
￿equivalent weeks in the spell￿ (these in turn are obtained by dividing the total number of hours worked in a 
part-time spell by the number of hours scheduled per week in the collective national contract for the same full-
time job, for example 40 hours per week) and the ￿number of paid weeks in the spell￿. The converting factor ￿ 
but not the number of hours ￿ is available in our data (See Contini, 2002, for further details).  
6 The ￿bump￿ concerns workers with a wage included in a range from ITL 1.217 to 1.546 million. They are 
prevalently female (54%), 15-24 years old (52%), blue collars (54%) and equally distributed among regional 
areas. They mainly work in small firms (80% in firms with less than 19 employees) and in the manufacturing 
sector (52%).   26 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 The p90/p50 and p50/p10 ratios for the US in 1995 were both equal to 2.1, compared to the value of 1.7 and 1.4 
we obtain for Italy for the same year. During the period 1985-95 in the US, p90/p50 changed by about 17% and 
p50/p10 had a positive growth of about 7-8% (our calculations from Table 3.1 in OECD, 1996).   
8 Comparing the percentile ratios with our figures in Table 1, one notes that our p90/p50 is systematically higher 
while our p50/p10 is always lower, pointing to a greater polarization of the INPS earnings distribution than in 
the Bank of Italy￿s. The differences in the nature of the two datasets (administrative data rather than survey 
data), as well as the income variable used (gross monthly earnings rather than net monthly earnings) are likely to 
be responsible for the observed differences. 
9 A compression of the wage differentials may for example occur if, in the face of an economic downturn, labor 
market institutions concentrate their efforts in the employment and wage protection of those at the bottom of the 
distribution. Lower inequality may also be the outcome of an economic slowdown where most lay-offs are 
concentrated amongst low-paid low-skill jobs (for example, very young workers), so that the distribution gets 
￿censored from below￿. 
10 A 12-observation regression of each of the inequality indices shown in Table 3 on a deterministic time trend, 
average earnings and its growth rate displayed positive but not statistically significant coefficients. 
11 The peak in the baby-boom of the Sixties manifest itself in the labour market at the beginning of the Eighties; 
the drop in the size of young cohorts has been impressive since. Other factors, such the reduced incentives to 
work and training contracts (CFL) starting in 1991, contribute to explain the drop in youth employment     
(Contini, 2002). 
12 Composition effects might have partly contributed to this change. The ￿Amato￿ pension reform in 1992 may 
have induced the 50-64 employee with medium/high wages to early retirement, while the same incentives were 
less appealing for those with very high wages. 
13 These results consider only regular jobs, while in the construction sector irregular jobs are easily diffused and, 
usually, they are low-paid jobs. 
14 Contini (2002) associates the relation between the worker￿s age and firm￿s size to the higher market entry/exit 
rates (and therefore shorter life) displayed by small firms. The higher turnover risk may be then more acceptable 
by young employees (Contini, 2002, p. 29).   
15 The North includes Piemonte, Valle d￿Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino, Veneto, Friuli, Liguria and Emilia 
Romagna; the Centre includes Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio and Abruzzo; the South includes Campania, 
Molise, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sardegna and Sicilia. 
16 Contini et al. (2000) note that this result might be spurious, arising from the wage normalization used, in the 
alleged presence of strategic mis-practices of southern firms to under-report the number of days worked by their 
employees. They show that the number of paid days reported for the South is less than for the North. For this 
reason, we have computed the regional wage distributions for the subsample of year-round employees (working 
312 days per year), in order to isolate regional earnings differences due to wage variation only. The difference 
between the North and the South somewhat re-emerge in the expected direction (with the North’s distribution 
lying everywhere to the right of the South’s). While mean earnings in 1996 were only 8% higher in the North 
than in the South if monthly earnings for all employees are used, while the figures doubles for year-round 
workers. 
17 A flexible specification is employeed, where log wages are regressed on a quartic in age and dummy 
indicators for part-time, firm￿s size and occupation, regional area, sector of activity, fully interacted with a 
polynomial in age. 
18 A large number (about 1,000) of 1995 white-collars have been relabelled managers in 1996 by the data 
collector without a corresponding change in the employee￿s job position. Re-estimation of the whole 
decomposition of section 5 after excluding 1996 (which otherwise would enter in the estimation of the average 
β) leads to indistinguishable results and are not reported.    
19 Needless to say, that unit wages for low-paid ￿flexible￿ workers have increased more than for corresponding 
￿stable￿ workers does not imply any assessment in terms of individual welfare, as the latter depends, among 
other things, on the actual amount of work.    27 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Percentiles Ratios and Earnings Shares for Decile Groups: 1985-1996 
 
  Percentile ratios    Decile earnings groups shares 
         (poorest)             (richest) 
year  p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10    1  2 3 4 5 6  7  8 9 10 
                       
1985  2.32 1.50 1.54    0.049  0.069 0.079 0.085 0.091 0.098  0.105  0.115 0.130  0.180 
1986  2.31 1.53 1.50    0.049  0.069 0.078 0.084 0.090 0.097  0.105  0.115 0.131  0.183 
1987  2.36 1.58 1.49    0.049  0.069 0.076 0.083 0.089 0.096  0.104  0.114 0.131  0.190 
1988  2.39 1.62 1.48    0.049  0.068 0.075 0.081 0.088 0.095  0.104  0.114 0.133  0.193 
1989  2.31 1.65 1.40    0.053  0.068 0.074 0.080 0.086 0.094  0.102  0.114 0.133  0.196 
1990  2.36 1.68 1.41    0.053  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.086 0.093  0.102  0.114 0.134  0.198 
1991  2.39 1.67 1.43    0.052  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.086 0.093  0.102  0.114 0.134  0.200 
1992  2.40 1.70 1.42    0.053  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.085 0.093  0.101  0.113 0.134  0.202 
1993  2.36 1.68 1.40    0.054  0.067 0.074 0.079 0.086 0.093  0.101  0.113 0.133  0.201 
1994  2.37 1.69 1.40    0.054  0.067 0.074 0.079 0.085 0.093  0.101  0.113 0.134  0.201 
1995  2.41 1.73 1.40    0.054  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.085 0.092  0.101  0.113 0.135  0.203 
1996  2.41 1.74 1.38    0.054  0.067 0.073 0.079 0.084 0.092  0.100  0.113 0.136  0.203 
% change 
1985-96 
3.9 15.6  -10.4    10.2  -2.9 -7.5 -7.0 -7.6 -6.1  -4.7  -1.7 4.6  12.7 
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Table 2 
Trends in earnings inequality, 1985-1996 
 
Year Inequality  measure 
  Gini  (s.e.)  Theil  (s.e.)  Var-logs  (s.e.) 
1985  189  (0.6)  62  (0.4)  122  (0.8) 
1986  192  (0.6)  64  (0.4)  123  (0.7) 
1987  200  (0.6)  70  (0.5)  130  (0.7) 
1988  206  (0.6)  74  (0.5)  135  (0.7) 
1989  206  (0.6)  75  (0.5)  129  (0.7) 
1990  210  (0.7)  77  (0.5)  134  (0.8) 
1991  213  (0.7)  80  (0.5)  138  (0.8) 
1992  213  (0.7)  81  (0.6)  136  (0.8) 
1993  209  (0.6)  79  (0.5)  131  (0.7) 
1994  210  (0.6)  79  (0.5)  132  (0.7) 
1995  213  (0.6)  81  (0.5)  136  (0.7) 
1996  214  (0.7)  81  (0.5)  137  (0.8) 
% change  
1985-96 
12.7 30.45  11.48 
 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in brackets (1000 replications). The values of the 
indices and of the s.e. have been multiplied by 1000. 
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Table 3 
Inequality decompositions by population subgroups, 1985 and 1996 
 
     (1)  (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7) 
 1000*GE(0)    1000*GE(1)    1000*GE(2)    Share  (%)    Mean    Relative 
mean 
 
Sub-group  partition 
1985 1996    1985  1996   1985 1996  1985 1996  1985 1996    1985  1996 
A All  persons  61  74    62  81   68  97   100 100    2674  2977    100  100 
B Male  58 77   59  84    65 99    70 67    2839  3151    1.06  1.06 
 Female  51 58   52  64    57 77    30 33    2289  2623    0.86  0.88 
 within-group inequality  56 71   57  78    64 94                
 between-group inequality  5 4    5  4    4 3                  
C Blue  collars  39 38   38  40    40 45    66 61    2552  2635    0.95  0.88 
 White  collars  68 70   68  74    73 83    26 32    3176  3553    1.19  1.19 
 Managers  50  33    37  32    31  32    0.4  2    6668 6983  2.49 2.35 
 Apprenticeship  44  32    45  35    49  40    7  5    1649 1691  0.62 0.57 
 within-group inequality  47 48   48  52    53 64                
 between-group inequality  14 26   14  29    15 34                
D North  58 75   59  82    67 99    62 63    2703  2997    1.01  1.01 
 Centre  63 82   64  89    71  106    18 18    2678  3022    1.00  1.02 
 South  68 66   66  71    70 83    20 19    2584  2871    0.97  0.96 
 within-group inequality  61 74   62  81    68 97                
 between-group inequality  0 0    0  0    0 0                  
E Age  15-24  46 38   45  39    47 44    26 17    2115  2169    0.79  0.73 
 Age  25-34  43 46   43  50    45 58    28 35    2663  2759    1.00  0.93 
 Age  35-49  59 75   60  81    67 93    32 35    3001  3372    1.12  1.13 
 Age  50-64  61 90   62  96    69  112    14 13    2981  3613    1.11  1.21 
 within-group inequality  51 60   52  68    59 84                
 between-group inequality  10 14   9 14    9  13                
F Manufacturing  57 72   58  78    64 94    57 52    2653  2925    0.99  0.98 
 Constructions  43 46   41  49    43 58    13 10    2722  2778    1.02  0.93 
 Services  77 84   79  91    88  108    30 38    2694  3099    1.01  1.04 
 within-group inequality  61 74   62  81    68 97                
 between-group inequality  0 1    0  1    0 1                  
G  Firm employees <5  52 42   52  46    57 56    22 19    2185  2399    0.82  0.80 
  Firm employees >6 & <19  51 48   51  53    56 64    25 23    2431  2552    0.91  0.86 
  Firm employees >20 & <99  52 66   53  73    60 89    22 23    2712  2882    1.00  0.97 
  Firm employees >100 & <499  50 74   52  80    58 93    14 15    2964  3252    1.00  1.09 
  Firm employees >500  42 67   44  69    48 77    16 20    3399  3881    1.27  1.32 
 within-group inequality  50 59   50  65    57 80                
 between-group inequality  11 16   11  16    12 17                
H Full-time  61 76   62  82    68 98    99 92    2674  3006    1.00  1.01 
  Part-time  61  53    66  61    77  76    1  8    2710 2652  1.01 0.89 
 within-group inequality  61 74   62  81    68 97                
 between-group inequality  0 1    0  1    0 1                  
 
Notes: Due to rounding, the sum of within-group and between-group inequality may not exactly add up to total inequality. 
Illustrative example, consider year 1985 and the gender decomposition (panel B). Column 2 shows that inequality over all 
persons (section A) is 61 according to the index GE(0). When we disaggregate according to gender, we calculate that 
inequality, in the same year and for the same index, is 58 for men and 51 for women. The share of men and women in 1985 is 
70 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively (column 5). Averaging inequality for men and for women, using these shares as 
weights, we obtain the within-group inequality value of 56. To compute the between-group inequality, we first eliminate 
inequality within men (i.e. assign to each man the men￿s mean earnings of reported in column 6) and inequality within 
women (i.e. assign to each woman the women￿s mean earnings reported in column 6). The between-group value of 5 
obtained in 1985 is the inequality that still remains between men and women. Column 7 reports the ratio of the group￿s mean 
earnings to the population mean.   35 
Table 4 
1985-1996 % change in mean earnings and percentiles, by subgroups 
 
         
   All workers  Full-time year-round workers
 
Feature  Group  mean p10  p50  p90 mean p10  p50 p90 
 All    11.3 15.4  3.7  19.9 13.3  3.8  8.6 20.5 
 Gender  Female 14.6  30.1  5.7  22.5  14.5  11.6  8.4  22.0 
  Male 11.0  6.3  3.4  20.6  13.3  2.4  8.2  21.5 
 Occupation  Blue Collars  1.5  2.3  -1.4  4.1  6.4  1.7  4.1  9.9 
  White Collars  8.1  7.3  4.4  10.2  11.5  5.8  9.6  13.1 
 Firm sector  Manufacturing  10.3 10.3  3.8  18.9 12.2 0.6 7.6  21.2 
  Construction  2.0 8.2 -4.0 5.3 1.8 4.4  -2.1  1.0 
  Service  15.0 25.2  7.7  19.5 15.4 14.1 11.3  20.7 
 Age  Young  2.6 13.9 -0.1 -0.4 1.9  4.9 0.6 0.9 
  Old 21.2  8.0  10.5  34.8  26.3  6.3  24.1  38.8 
 Firm size  ≤ 5 empl.  9.8 31.4 5.2  5.2 9.4 24.5 5.6 7.5 
  ≥ 6 & ≤ 19 empl.  5.0 19.3 1.2  5.7 7.3  5.3 5.5 7.7 
  ≥ 20 & ≤ 99 empl.  6.3 1.0 0.5 0.5  10.5  2.5 6.8  15.8 
  ≥ 100 & ≤ 499 empl.  9.8 -1.1 5.2 18.3  15.0 2.8  10.8  23.5 
  ≥ 500 empl.  15.3 1.6 12.9  24.8  18.4 6.6 16.6  28.3 
North  10.9 8.4  4.3 19.2  13.3 3.4 9.0  21.0  Regional 
Area  Center  12.8 15.7  3.3  25.1 14.4 5.0 7.7  22.9 
  South  11.1 34.3  1.9  17.0 10.9 10.1 4.1 14.0 
Part-time  Part-time  -2.1 3.6 -4.6 -4.5       
 
Notes: Full-time year round workers include employees working 312 days per year (equivalent to 52 paid 
weeks).    36 
Table 5 


















  A.  1985-95 
90-10  0.011 0.101  0.017  0.130 
90-50  0.052 0.069  0.026  0.148 
50-10  -0.042 0.032  -0.008  -0.018 
        
  B.  1985-88 
90-10  0.000 0.065  0.008  0.073 
90-50  0.022 0.030  0.015  0.068 
50-10  -0.022 0.035  -0.008  0.005 
        
  C.  1989-92 
90-10  0.013 0.024  0.012  0.049 
90-50  0.010 0.016  0.005  0.031 
50-10  0.002 0.008  0.007  0.017 
        
  D.  1993-96 
90-10  0.027 -0.000  0.002  0.029 
90-50  0.038 -0.004  0.002  0.035 
50-10  -0.010 0.004  0.000  -0.006 
        
Notes men only.  